Abstract A rigorous framework for analyzing safe composition of distributed programs is presented. It facilitates specifying notions of safe sequential execution of distributed programs in various models of communication. A notion of sealing is defined, where if a program P is immediately followed by a program Q that seals P then P will be communication-closed-it will execute as if it runs in isolation. None of its send or receive actions will match or interact with actions outside P. The applicability of sealing is illustrated by a study of program composition when communication is reliable but not necessarily FIFO. In this model, special care must be taken to ensure that messages do not accidentally overtake one another in the composed program. In this model no program that sends or receives messages can be composed automatically with arbitrary programs without jeopardizing their intended behavior. Safety of composi- A characterization of sealable programs is given, as well as efficient algorithms for testing if Q seals P and for constructing a seal for a class of straight-line programs. It is shown that every sealable program can be sealed using O(n) messages. In fact, 3n − 4 messages are necessary and sufficient in the worst case, despite the fact that a sealable program may be open to interference on (n 2 ) channels.
tion becomes context-sensitive and new tools are needed for ensuring it. The investigation of sealing in this model reveals a novel connection between Lamport causality and safe composition. A characterization of sealable programs is given, as well as efficient algorithms for testing if Q seals P and for constructing a seal for a class of straight-line programs. It is shown that every sealable program can be sealed using O(n) messages. In fact, 3n − 4 messages are necessary and sufficient in the worst case, despite the fact that a sealable program may be open to interference on (n 2 ) channels.
Introduction
Much of the distributed algorithms literature is devoted to solutions for individual tasks. Implicitly it may appear that these solutions can be readily combined to create larger applications. Composing such solutions is not, however, automatically guaranteed to maintain their correctness and their intended behavior. For example, algorithms are typically designed under the assumption that they begin executing in a well-defined initial global state in which all channels are empty. In most cases, the algorithms are not guaranteed to terminate in such a state. Distributed systems applications are often designed in clearly separated phases, even though these phases typically execute concurrently. For instance, using MST to refer to a minimum-weight spanning tree of the network and STtoLeader protocol to refer to a protocol using a spanning tree to elect a leader node, Lynch writes in [16, p. 523]:
"An MST algorithm can be used to solve the leaderelection problem […] . Namely, after establishing an MST, the processes participate in the STtoLeader protocol to select the leader. Note that the processes do not need to know when the MST algorithm has completed its execution throughout the network; it is enough for each process i to wait until it is finished locally, that is, has output its set of incident edges in the MST."
In general, when two phases, such as implementations of an MST algorithm and of the STtoLeader algorithm, are developed independently and then executed in sequence, one phase may confuse messages originating from the other with its own messages.
A customary way of avoiding such confusion is to introduce message headers or, more generally, ensure that different phases use disjoint message alphabets. Effectively, this amounts to allowing different phases to communicate on disjoint sets of virtual channels. A fundamental question considered in this paper is: when is it safe to compose phases that communicate using the same message alphabet? Namely, when and how is it possible to avoid the use of message headers? This is obviously a model-dependent issue, as safe composition depends in a crucial way on properties such as synchrony, reliability of communication, and whether channels are FIFO. Being able to establish composition safety can allow us to eliminate the overhead of erecting virtual channels.
An interesting application in which care is taken to ensure that communication obeys phase order is in the design of synchronizers by Awerbuch [2] . There, a program P designed for a round-synchronous message-passing system needs to be executed in an asynchronous setting. Running P without any modification will in general give rise to executions that do not appear in the synchronous setting, and may violate some of the intended properties of P. The synchronizers defined in [2] introduce a control layer between every two rounds of P, which ensures that the phases of P are executed in the same manner in the asynchronous setting as in the synchronous one.
When communication is guaranteed to deliver messages in FIFO order, safe composition requires that a process be able to determine if a received message belongs to the following phase, thereby allowing a transition from one phase to the next. Life is more interesting in models that allow messages to be reordered.
Consider for instance the task of transmitting a message from process i to process k. The task is accomplished by having i perform a send action and k perform a corresponding receive action (See Fig. 1a ). This implementation works fine in isolation. Composing two copies, however, does not guarantee the same behavior as executing the first to completion and then executing the second. Since communication is not FIFO, the second message sent by i could be the first one received by k (See Fig. 1b) . Thus, executing programs sequentially in this model may be unsafe. As we now show, however, there are cases in which particular programs do compose in a safe manner. Now consider a program in which a message transmission from i to k is immediately followed by one in the other direction, from k to i (See Fig. 2 ). In this case each message sent is received in the phase it was sent. In fact, assuming that the programs start out with empty channels, a stronger property is satisfied in this example. Despite the fact that messages may be reordered by the communication channel, no matter which program is executed later on, the message sent in the first phase from i to k will never be received out of phase. Of course the second transmission is still susceptible to interference, e.g., by another transmission in the same direction. We think of the second transmission (from k to i) as sealing the first transmission. More precisely (although formal definitions will come later on) we think of a program Q as sealing another program P if when Q is executed immediately after P we are ensured that no communication operations in P will interact with ones in Q or in any later phase. In particular, the second transmission in Fig. 2 is said to seal the first transmission.
Contributions The first contribution of this paper is in presenting a framework for studying safe composition of layers of distributed programs in different models of communication. It introduces a novel specification construct called silent cut in the context of a semantics for refinement and layered composition of programs. Within the framework we can represent notions related to safe composition including the communication-closed layers of Elrad and Francez [5] and other related notions from the literature. Moreover, we define the notion of sealing among programs, and argue that it allows for a structured compositional approach to safe program construction. In a companion paper [7] the framework is used to define additional notions that are used to study safe composition in FIFO-models with duplicating and/or lossy channels.
Our second contribution is a case study with a comprehensive analysis of sealing among straight-line programs in a model, which we denote by Rel, in which channels are reliable but messages may be delivered out of order. We study the theory of sealing in Rel and present the following results.
-Sealable straight-line programs are completely characterized. -A definition of the sealing signature of straight-line programs is given, which characterizes the sealing behavior of a program concisely, for both purposes, sealing and being sealed. The size of the signature is O(n 3 ). -An algorithm for deciding whether Q seals P based only on their signatures is presented. -The notion of sealing is shown to be closely related to Lamport causality [15] . Thus, ensuring that Q seals P is tantamount to Q causing P to be a communication-closed layer. -An algorithm for constructing seals for sealable straightline programs is presented. It produces seals that perform less than 3n message transmissions even though (n 2 ) channels may need to be sealed. -Finally, a lower bound is proved showing that our sealing algorithm uses an optimal number of messages in the worst case.
The restriction to straight-line programs is motivated by the undecidability of the corresponding problems for general programs. Specifically, the halting problem can be reduced to each of these problems for general programs. As far as communication closure is concerned, straight-line programs already display many of the interesting aspects relevant to the subject of sealing.
Further intuition regarding sealing in Rel
As illustrated by Fig. 2 , a message transmission from k to i seals one from i to k; let us consider why. Suppose that a later message is sent on the channel from i to k as in Fig. 2 . This send is performed only after the message sent in the opposite direction has been received by i, which in turn must have been sent after the first message has been received by k. Consequently, k's receive event must precede i's sending of the later message. Therefore, the later message cannot compete with the earlier one. A message transmitted in the opposite direction is often called an acknowledgment. Lamport [15] defined (potential) causality among events of asynchronous message passing systems. Causality implies temporal precedence. As discussed above, receiving an acknowledgment before sending a new message to process k guarantees that the receive of the acknowledged message by k causally precedes any later sends on the same channel. Observe that the same effect could be obtained by other means. For instance, a causal chain consisting of a sequence of messages starting at k, going through a number of intermediate processes, and ending at i could be used just as well. Clearly, sending a chain of messages to obtain this transitive form of acknowledgment is an inefficient way of sending a single acknowledgment. Since a given message can play a role in a number of transitive acknowledgments, this can be used efficiently when many acknowledgments are required. Figure 3a illustrates a program consisting of the transmission of three messages over three different channels. It is sealed using transitive acknowledgments by the program displayed in Fig. 3b , which sends only two messages.
Not all programs can be sealed. For example, program X shown in Fig. 4a is unsealable. There are only two channels in the system in question. Intuitively, the first message that is sent on either channel after X might cause interference via message reordering. Hence, a potential seal Q for X cannot safely send messages after X . But if Q does not send messages, then a send performed in either direction after Q will be unsafe. In this case Q once again would not have sealed X . The same program executed in the presence of a third process as in Fig. 4b is, however, sealable. Any seal of this program will necessarily use transitive acknowledgments as discussed above. See Fig. 4c for an illustration of one way this program can be sealed. 
Background and related work
Perhaps the first formal treatment of the phase composition problem was via the notion of communication-closed layers introduced by Elrad and Francez [5] . Consider a program P = P 1 . . . P n consisting of n concurrent
. . . Q n , executing concurrently with possible overlap. Elrad and Francez [5] define L to be a communication-closed layer (CCL) in this program P if under no execution of P does a command in some L communicate with a command in any Q or Q . If a program P can be decomposed into a sequence of CCLs then every execution of P can be viewed as a concatenation of executions of P's layers in order. Hence, reasoning about P can be reduced to reasoning about its layers in isolation.
Stomp and de Roever [18] [19] [20] considered sequentially phased reasoning and CCLs in the context of message passing systems.
The notion of CCLs was further studied and couched in a refinement setting by Zwiers et al. in a sequence of papers [8, 11, 14, 17, 22] . They define a notion of "conflict" between actions in a shared-variable model and consider conflict composition of programs, in which actions that do not conflict can be concurrent, while conflicting actions need to be executed in sequence. Using this notion, they present a refinement framework for developing concurrent and distributed applications top-down from specifications to implementations. The power and applicability of this framework were demonstrated in a number of case studies, treating well-known problems [12, 13] .
Perhaps their most compelling example is the derivation of a minimum-weight spanning tree algorithm for asynchronous systems [12] inspired in part by ideas from [18, 19] . Janssen [10] further extended this line of work by considering epistemic logics to specify CCLs.
In [9] Gerth and Shrira considered the issue of using distributed programs as off-the-shelf components to serve as layers in larger distributed programs. They observe that the above definition of CCL is made with respect to the whole program P as context. They seek to facilitate a methodology in which programs can be designed so that they can be composed in an arbitrary order while still ensuring safe composition. To this end, they define L to be a general tail communication closed (GTCC) layer if, roughly speaking,
Since this definition does not refer to the surrounding program context of a layer, it asserts a certain quality of composability. Composing GTCC layers sequentially guarantees that each one of them is a CCL in the resulting program. GTCC layers can then be used as off-theshelf components in the design of more complex distributed programs.
The Rel model, on which our case study in Sect. 5 will focus, is perhaps a model less common than, say TCP (reliable message passing without reordering). We note that Ben-Ari [3] chose precisely Rel to study distributed algorithms in Chapters 10-12 of the most recent edition of his textbook.
A model of distributed programs with layering
In this section we define a simple language for writing message-passing concurrent programs. Its composition operator " * " is called layering. Layering subsumes the two more traditional operators ";" and " " (as discussed by Janssen et al. [11] ). The meaning of P * Q is that each process i first executes its share of P and then proceeds directly to execute its share of Q. In particular, layering does not impose any barrier synchronization between P and Q. In other words, in P * Q process i need not wait for any other processes to finish their shares of P before moving on to Q. Consequently, when programs are composed via such layering, a program's execution need not start and end at well-defined global states. Instead, a program executes between two cuts, where a cut specifies a local time point for each one of the processes. To account for this, we shall define a notion r [c, d] P of a program P occurring over an interval r [c, d] Our later analysis will be concerned with designing programs P that will be CCLs. Thus, we need to ensure that no message crosses any initial or final cut of an interval over which P occurs. A concise way of capturing this formally is via a new language construct, the silent cut, denoted by ' '. Writing specifies that all communication channels are empty at this cut. In other words, no statement to the left of the can communicate with a statement to the right. 1 We adopt a standard notion of refinement to indicate substitutability of programs. Program P refines program Q if, whenever P occurs over an interval r [c, d] then also Q occurs over r [c, d] , regardless of what happens before c and after d. The notions of " * ", " ", and refinement provide a unified language for defining notions of safe composition. The programming language and its semantics are formally defined as follows.
Syntax
Let n ∈ N and P = {1, . . . , n} be a set of processes. Throughout the paper n will be reserved for denoting the number of processes. Let (Var i ) i∈P be nonempty and mutually disjoint sets of program variables (of process i) not containing the name h i which is reserved for i's communication history. Let Expr i be the set of arithmetic expressions over Var i . Let L be propositional logic over atoms formed from expressions with equality "=" and less-than "<". We define a syntactic category Prg of programs:
The intuitive meaning of these constructs is as follows. The symbol ε denotes the empty program. It takes no time to execute. Assignment statement x := e evaluates expression e and assigns its value to variable x. If x ∈ Var i , then we call the statement x := x a skip i statement. It is an action by i that has no effect. The snd i→k e statement sends a message containing the value of e on the channel from i to k. Communication is asynchronous, and sending is non-blocking. The rcv k←i x statement, however, blocks until a message arrives on the channel from i to k. It takes a message off the channel and assigns its content to x. The guard [φ] expresses a constraint on the execution of the program: in a run of the program, φ must hold at this location. Guards take no time to execute. The program is a guard-like constraint stating that all channels must be empty at this location. Formally, our propositional language L is not expressive enough to define 1 In place of the silent cut the preliminary version of this paper [6] used a phase quantifier τ . Program τ P roughly corresponds to our P . as a guard because formulas are not capable of referring to channel contents. The operation " * " represents layered composition following Janssen et al. [11] . Layering statements of distinct processes is essentially the same as parallel composition whereas layering of statements of the same process corresponds to sequential composition. We tend to omit " * " when no confusion will arise. The symbol "+" denotes nondeterministic choice. By P ω we denote zero or more (possibly infinitely many) repetitions of program P connected by * .
Using guards, choices, and repetition it is possible to define if φ then P else Q fi as an abbreviation for [φ]P + [¬φ]Q and while φ do P od for ([φ]P) ω [¬φ] . The results in this paper also hold for a language based on if and while instead of [.], +, and ω .
The fact that rcv k←i is a blocking action may seem very restrictive, since a process blocks on a particular channel until a message arrives. We are not assuming input enabledness (see [16] ), in which a message delivery is not controlled by the receiving process. We can however capture the case in which a process waits to receive a message that may arrive on a channel whose identity is not known a priori. In fact, by using the choice operator +, we can capture an action such as rcv k←i 1 + · · · + rcv k←i m in which the process may receive on any one of m channels. is an infinite sequence of local states. We identify an event (of i) with the transition from one local state in a local run of i to the next. An event is either a send, a receive, or an internal event. A (global) run is a tuple r = ((r i ) i∈P , δ r ) of local runs-one for each process-plus an injective matching function δ r associating a send event with each receive event in r . The mapping δ r is restricted such that: 2 1. If δ r (e) = e and e is a receive event of process k resulting in the appending of (k ← i, v) to k's message history then e is a send event of process i appending the corresponding send record (i → k, v) to i's message history.
2. Lamport's causality relation l − → induced by δ r on the events of r , as defined below, is an irreflexive partial order, hence acyclic.
The first condition captures the property that messages are not corrupted in transit. The fact that the function δ r is total precludes the reception of spurious messages, whereas injectivity ensures that messages are not duplicated in transit. By modifying these assumptions appropriately we can of course capture message corruption and/or duplication and the like. Moreover, further restrictions on δ r can be made to capture additional properties of the communication medium such as reliability, FIFO, fairness, etc.
Intuitively, the Rel model consists of the set of all runs in which communication channels are reliable even though messages may be reordered. Since we are considering a setting in which receives are deliberate actions we cannot capture Rel by saying simply that every message sent is guaranteed to be received. We need to rule out the case in which the intended receiver stopped performing receive actions on the channel. We shall capture this by saying that, on a channel in which infinitely many messages are delivered in a given run, every message sent is received. Formally, we say that r ∈ Rel if no unmatched send event on a given channel is succeeded by infinitely many matched send events on the same channel.
In [15] Lamport defined a "happened before" relation l − → on the set of events occurring in a run r of a distributed system. The relation l − → is defined as the smallest transitive relation subsuming (1) the total orders on the events of process i given by the local run r i , and (2) the relation {(e 1 , e 2 ) | δ r (e 2 ) = e 1 } between send and receive events induced by the matching function δ r . 3 
Cuts and channels
Write N + for N∪{∞}. A cut is a pair (r, c) consisting of a run r and a P-indexed family c = (c i ) i∈P of N + -elements. We write "≤" for the component-wise extension of the natural ordering on N + to cuts within the same run. A cut is finite if none of its components are ∞.
Say that an event e performed by process i is in a cut (r, c) if e occurs in r i at an index no larger than c i , and that e occurs outside of (r, c) if the index is larger than c i . A cut (r, c) corresponds to the, possibly implausible, situation in which the events in the cut have occurred for each process i ∈ P. Since a cut specifies an arbitrary set of local times for the processes, it is possible for a message to be received in a given cut without having been sent in the cut. Hence, to 3 In this paper we consider the describe the state of a channel at a cut we choose to account both for messages that have been sent and not yet received and for ones that were received although not yet sent. Thus, we formally define the channel chan i→k at a cut (r, c) to be the set of i's send events to k and k's receive events from i in (r, c) that are not matched by δ r to any event also in (r, c). Finally, a formula φ ∈ L holds at (r, c), and we write (r, c) | φ, if φ holds in standard propositional logic when, for each i ∈ P, program variables in Var i are evaluated in the local states r i (c i ) if c i is finite, and are considered unspecified otherwise. 4 While cuts can in general be arbitrary, there are many instances in which more restricted and well-behaved cuts may be of interest. Indeed, we can define a cut (r, c) to be consistent if every l − → predecessor of an event in the cut (r, c) is also in (r, c). Moreover, in this work we make use of to capture a stronger property of cuts-that all channels are empty at the cut.
Semantics of programs
We define the meaning of programs by stating when a program occurs over an interval. An interval consists of two cuts (r, c) and (r, d) over the same run with c ≤ d, which we denote for simplicity by
We define the occurrence relation between intervals and programs by induction on the structure of programs. The interesting cases are those of * and . Formally, program P ∈ Prg occurs over interval 
Refinement
We shall capture various assumptions about properties of systems by specifying sets of runs. For instance, Rel is the class of runs with reliable communication, and RelFi is its subclass in which channels are also FIFO.
Given a set of runs, we say that P refines Q in , denoted
In other words, every execution of P (in a run) is also one of Q, regardless of what happens before and after. Therefore, in systems guaranteed to generate only runs in , we may replace Q by P in any larger program context. This definition of refinement is thus appropriate for stepwise top-down development of programs from specifications. The refinement relation on programs is transitive (in fact a pre-order) and all programming constructs are monotone w.r.t. the refinement order.
Deadlocks It is worth noting that our semantics explicitly models successful executions of programs, but does not directly represent deadlocks. The blocking actions that may appear in our programs are receives rcv i←k x and guards [φ] .
An example of a deadlocked program is
y in which each of the two processes waits to receive a message from the other, and there are no messages in transit between them. The receive actions will thus never take place, and neither of the processes will ever be able to perform another action. Observe that r [c, d] D will not hold for any interval r [c, d]. 7 A direct consequence of our definition of refinement is that a program that necessarily deadlocks, such as the program D just described, is guaranteed to refine all programs. Thus, our notion of refinement is meaningful mainly for programs that do not deadlock. There is a broad literature on deadlocks and deadlock detection in distributed systems [4, 16] . Our treatment below will apply mainly to non-deadlocking programs, with the task of detecting deadlocks requiring treatment by additional machinery. For example, in Sect. 5.2 we characterize deadlocks for a particular class of programs under discussion, and provide an efficient algorithm for detecting whether a program is prone to deadlock. In order to avoid the need of repeatedly mentioning deadlocks in the sequel, we shall make the following General assumption Unless stated otherwise, all our programs are assumed to be deadlock-free.
Capturing safe composition and sealing
The silent cut program allows us to delineate the interactions that a layer can have with other parts of the program.
When combined with refinement it is useful for defining various notions central to the study of safe composition, as we now illustrate.
CCL We can express that the program L is a CCL in the program P * L * Q w.r.t. by:
In words, any isolated execution of P * L * Q will have the property that all communication in L is internal and hence L executes as if in isolation. This definition is context-sensitive, where the context consists of both P and Q.
Barriers More modular would be a notion that guarantees safe composition regardless of the program context. One technique to ensure that two consecutive layers do not interfere with each other is to place a barrier B between them. Formally, program B is a barrier in if
Traditionally, barriers have been used to synchronize processes that progress through a sequence of tasks by enforcing that no process could start its n + 1 st task before all the other processes had completed their n th tasks. This could be formalized by requiring that, if
), for all runs r ∈ , and programs P, Q.
TCC Some programs can be safely composed without the need for communication-closedness [5, 12] . Depending on the model , there may be programs P that safely compose with all following layers. We say that P is tail communication closed (TCC) in if
Thus, if P is TCC then any execution of P starting in empty channels will also end with all channels empty. Therefore TCC programs can be readily composed. 8 It is straightforward to check that the programs ε, [φ], x := e, and P are TCC in any . Moreover, if P and Q are TCC in then so are P + Q, P * Q, and P ω . Observe that every barrier B in is in particular TCC in .
Seals In many models of interest, only trivial programs are TCC. This is the case, for example, in Rel, as shown in Theorem 1. In such models, an alternative methodology is required for determining when it is safe to compose given programs. Next we define a notion of sealing that formalizes the concept of program S serving as an impermeable layer between P and later phases such that no later communication actions will interact with P. We say that S seals P in if
Thus, if S seals P in then neither S nor any later program can interfere with communication in P. If S seals P and Q seals S, then S will behave in P * S * Q as it does in isolation.
Sealing and synchronizers It is of interest to consider the connection between Awerbuch's synchronizers in [2] and sealing. Given a synchronous program For instance, since transmission of a single message from process i to process k is a program that cannot diverge and that seals a transmission in the opposite direction, the former is in particular a proper seal for the latter. Observe that, intuitively, one possible way of properly sealing a program P would be by a program S that necessarily deadlocks after P, so that P * Q would not occur over any interval r [c, d] . This is avoided in our case by the general assumption that programs we consider are deadlock-free. 
Having shown that TCC and thus barriers are not generally useful notions in Rel, we turn our attention to (proper) sealing. It is instructive that not all terminating programs can be properly sealed in Rel: S there must be a send by 1 matched by δ r to process 2's receive in X and another send by 1 matched to e 2 . At least one of these takes place after e 1 (and is, in particular, causally preceded by e 1 ), since only one send is performed by 1 before e 1 . It follows that e 1 l − → e 2 . If e 2 were also a receive, a completely symmetric argument would yield that e 2 l − → e 1 , in which case l − → would be cyclic on r , contradicting the fact that r ∈ Rel. The claim follows.
Our programming language Prg is Turing-complete. Since the halting problem for Prg can be reduced to sealability in Rel we obtain Theorem 2 Sealability in Rel is undecidable.
(The detailed proof can be found in Appendix A).
Sealability for balanced, straight-line programs
Given Theorem 2 we shall restrict our attention to more tractable subclasses of programs. Program P is balanced (in Rel) if, whenever r [c, d] P and all channels are empty at (r, c), then every channel contains an equal number of sends and receives at (r, d). Note that balanced programs are TCC in RelFi. A program P is straight-line if it contains neither nondeterministic choices nor loops nor guards. In other words, P is built from sends, receives, and assignments using layering only. Our focus in this section is on balanced straight-line programs, or BSLs for short.
The following theorem shows that in Rel balance is a necessary prerequisite for being properly sealable. The following lemma justifies that we can focus on sealing rather than proper sealing in this section on BSLs. Its claim is immediate from the fact that BSLs cannot diverge.
Theorem 3 In
Rel, every non-divergent program that is properly sealable is also balanced. Proof Let P and S be programs such that in Rel P does not diverge and S properly seals P. Assume by way of contradiction that P is not balanced. Let r ∈ Rel and c, c , d be such that r [c, c ] P, r [c , d] S, all channels are empty in (r, c), and, w.l.o.g., chan i→k contains m sends and h receives at
Lemma 3 Sealing among BSLs is always proper.
Program graphs The program graph of a BSL P is a graph (V, E) that has a node for every send and receive event in P plus an initial dummy node fst i and a final dummy node lst i for each process i. The edge set E consists of the successor relation over events in the same process extended to the dummy nodes plus an edge between the mth send and the mth receive on channel chan i→k , for all m, i, and k. All the graphs in Figs. 1-4 are program graphs except for Fig. 1b , which illustrates reordering of messages by having edges from the first send to the second receive and from the second send to the first receive. The size of a BSL's program graph is of the order of the size of the BSL .
Next we reveal an interesting connection between program graphs and Lamport causality. We use E + to refer to the irreflexive transitive closure of a set of edges E. We call edges that do not contain dummy nodes normal, and denote the subset of normal edges by N E . In RelFi, the normal edges induce the full causality relation on the events of the program. For ease of exposition, we shall often abuse notation slightly and identify events in an execution r [c, d] of a BSL P with nodes of its program graph. This is unambiguous, since there is a one-to-one correspondence between the events and the nodes they are identified with. Moreover, we shall say that an event e causally precedes e in a program P, with the intended meaning that e l − → e holds in every Rel execution
We now show that in the Rel model, normal edges of a program graph are guaranteed to be l − → edges.
Lemma 4 Let r ∈ Rel and let P be a BSL with program graph (V, E). If r[c, d] P then N E
Proof The only interesting normal edges are those between sends and receives of different processes. Consider the edge (e 1 , e 2 ) ∈ E between the mth send and the mth receive on chan i→k . Let r ∈ Rel such that r [c, d] P and assume that e 3 = δ r (e 2 ) is the th send on chan i→k in P. We need to show that e 1 Lemma 4 implies that all edges in (N E ) + will be l − → edges in every run r ∈ Rel of P. We note that (N E ) + is the largest set of edges with this property because (N E ) + captures precisely the necessary Lamport causality in Rel. This is formally captured by the following. Proof Let (V, E) be P's program graph, and let v, w ∈ V . Observe that the definition of the N E edges matches send and receive events in FIFO order. The proof of Lemma 5 thus shows that, among communication events, RelFi executions of a program P have precisely the Lamport causality common to the intersection of all Rel executions of P.
Lemma 5 Let P be a BSL with program graph (V, E) and let v, w be non-dummy nodes of V . Then (v, w) ∈ (N E
)
Deadlock in BSLs
Since we shall be studying refinement for programs that are assumed to be deadlock-free, it is desirable to be able to identify these programs explicitly. At this point we are able to characterize and decide based on the structure of a BSL whether it has a deadlocking execution in Rel. Recall that our program semantics does not capture deadlocks directly. We can, however, still define when a program is deadlocked at a cut outside of the semantics. We now give a definition for straight-line programs because that is all we need for the following result. Recall that the only blocking action in a straight-line program is a receive that waits on a particular channel. In the sequel we will use ⊕ m 1 to represent the successor function in {1, . . . , m}, that is k ⊕ m 1 = (k mod m) + 1. We can now prove the following lemma, which provides the formal justification for the procedure Deadlock-Free in Appendix B, deciding whether a program deadlocks.
Lemma 6 Let P be a BSL. Then P has a deadlocking execution in Rel iff its program graph contains a cycle.
Proof Let P be a BSL and let (V, E) be its program graph. "⇒:" Suppose that P has a deadlocking execution in Rel.
Let P = P * P and r ∈ Rel satisfy that r [c, d] P and P is deadlocked at (r, d). For ease of exposition, assume without loss of generality that the sequence of deadlocked processes is 1, . . . , m . For k = 1, . . . , m, let e k be k's first action in P (which by definition is of the form rcv k←k⊕ m 1 ). Our goal is to show that there is an (N E ) + path from e k⊕ m 1 to e k in P's program graph. From this it will follow that P's program graph has a cycle, as desired. Fix k. Suppose that process k's first action in the second subprogram P is the n k th receive on the channel chan k→k⊕ m 1 in P. Thus, there are n k − 1 ≥ 0 receives on the channel in the first subprogram P . The assumption that k participates in the deadlock of P at (r, d) implies that the number of send events on chan k→k⊕ m 1 in P is smaller than n k , since otherwise there would necessarily be a send in the channel in (r, d). Since P is balanced, there is an n k th send on the channel (performed by process k ⊕ m 1) in P. But that send must appear after the first action for k ⊕ m 1 (a receive) in P . Thus, if we denote by e the n k th send on the channel then we have that (e k⊕ m 1 , e ) ∈ E because both are events on k ⊕ m 1 and e is the later action. Moreover, by definition of the program graph we have that (e , e k ) ∈ E since e is the n k th send on the channel, and e k is the n k th receive. We thus obtain an (N E ) + path from e k⊕ m 1 to e k in P's program graph as desired, and we are done with the "⇒" direction. P, contrary to our assumption. The lack of executions of P over any interval of any run in Rel indicates that P necessarily deadlocks in Rel.
We can further show that composing non-deadlocking BSLs is guaranteed to yield a non-deadlocking BSL:
Lemma 7 If P and Q are non-deadlocking BSLs, then so is P * Q.
Proof Let P and Q be BSLs with acyclic program graphs. Then P * Q is clearly balanced, as it has the sum of snd i→k and rcv k←i actions in P and in Q, for all channels chan i→k , and it is also immediately a straight-line program. Its program graph is acyclic, because we are concatenating two DAGs, connecting the first DAG's sinks with the second one's source nodes. The claim follows.
Program graphs mimic RelFi executions of a BSL. Indeed, we can show that BSLs have RelFi executions:
Lemma 8 If P is a non-deadlocking BSL, then there is an interval satisfying r [c, d]
P where r is a RelFi run.
Proof Let P be a non-deadlocking BSL. We construct the run r = ((r i ) i∈P , δ r ) as follows. For every i ∈ P the local run r i consists of executing the m i actions in i's portion of P, followed by infinitely many skip i actions. For every channel chan i→k , the matching function δ r matches the receives rcv k←i on the channel with snd i→k actions in FIFO order:
The first receive to the first send, …, the mth receive to the mth send, etc. The l − → relation in this case coincides with (N E ) + , and since P does not deadlock, l − → is acyclic. Thus r ∈ Rel and since δ r conforms with FIFO ordering, r is a run of RelFi. Finally, let c = (0) i∈P and let (r, d) be the cut reached after executing P from (r, c) onward. It is straightforward to check that r [c, d] P, as desired.
Deciding sealing
In this section, let P and Q be BSLs. Roughly speaking, for Q to seal P it must guarantee that before any message is sent on a channel chan i→k after P is executed, the channel is emptied. This ensures that the later message will not participate in a race against a message sent by P over the same channel. Since P is balanced, it also guarantees that all receives on chan i→k in P are matched with sends in P, and none will be available to match later sends. For ease of exposition, we make the following definition. We say that Q closes chan i→k after P (in Rel) if chan i→k is empty between P and Q in every execution of P * Q. If the empty program ε closes chan i→k after P we also say that chan i→k is closed by P. A channel that is not closed by P is left open by it.
Corollary 2 In Rel, program Q seals P iff Q closes every channel after P.
Lamport causality plays an important role in determining sealing among BSLs in Rel. Intuitively, if the last rcv k←i in P causally precedes the first snd i→k that takes place after P, then chan i→k is empty before the later send. The notion of closing a channel after a program can also be characterized using causality. Proof Observe that since P and Q are implicitly assumed to be non-deadlocking BSLs and mt i→k is one, too, Lemma 7
Lemma 9 In
implies that the program P = P * Q * mt i→k is a non-deadlocking BSL. "⇒:" We prove the contrapositive. Thus, we assume that there is at least one rcv k←i in P, and the condition of 2 fails. Since P is balanced, we obtain that there is also at least one snd i→k in P. Let e be the last action on i in P * Q that precedes all snd i→k actions in Q. Such an action e exists because the snd i→k in P precedes all snd i→k events in Q.
By assumption, there is an action e 1 = rcv k←i in P that does not causally precede e (for otherwise the condition would not fail). Let (V, E) and (V , E ) be the program graphs of P * Q and P * Q * mt i→k , respectively. Lemma 
only changes one or two message deliveries in δ r , the fact that no unmatched send event in r on a given channel is succeeded by infinitely many matched send events on the same channel implies that the same holds for r . It follows that r ∈ Rel and r is a witness to the fact that Q does not close chan i→k after P, since the receive event e 1 of P is matched in r to a send event not in P, which implies that the channel is not empty at (r , d), between P and Q. by P being balanced and thus having the same finite number of snd i→k as rcv k←i actions, δ r cannot map all of the
we derive a contradiction as in the case e = rcv k←i . We conclude that chan i→k is empty at (r, d).
Intuitively, the previous two results say that for Q to seal P, it must ensure during its execution that all receives by P are matched. Moreover, if Q sends messages along channel, then P's receives on that channel must be matched before Q sends on the channel. The channels are thus sure to be emptied after P before any later use. Corollary 2 can be used to decide sealing among BSLs, given a way of determining causal precedence among actions in a program. Recall that Lemma 5 relates the program graph to Lamport causality. Combining the two results it is possible to derive a decision procedure for sealing based on program graphs. We will design a somewhat more efficient procedure of this, based on a concise summary of the program graph that we call the signature of a program. Signatures keep track of enough information for deciding sealing.
Signatures Given the program graph (V P , E P ) of P we obtain the signature of P, denoted by Sig(P) = (V s , E s ), as follows (see algorithm Sig(P) in Appendix B).
-V s contains of the 2n dummy nodes fst i and lst i , as well as nodes corresponding to sends and receives as follows.
A snd i→k node v ∈ V P is in V s exactly if both v corresponds to the last snd i→k in P and (fst k , v) / ∈ E + P ; similarly, a rcv k←i node w ∈ V P is in V s exactly if both w corresponds to the last rcv k←i in P and (w, lst i ) / ∈ E + P . -The edges of Sig(P) are the result of restricting E + P to the vertices in V s .
Observe that the signature has size O(n 3 ), and its size does not grow with that of the program graph. In many natural instances the signature is significantly smaller than that. The signature edges that connect dummy nodes and communication nodes are there to facilitate performing the tests in Lemma 9, while the remaining edges make it possible to construct Sig(P * Q) from Sig(P) and Sig(Q). (See algorithm Signature-Compose in Appendix B). As our focus is on deciding sealing, we can now combine Corollary 2 and Lemma 9 with Lemma 5 to obtain:
Proof "⇐:" Based on Corollary 2, it suffices to prove that Q closes every channel chan i→k after P. We do this by showing that the conditions of Lemma 9 are satisfied for every channel. Denote the program graphs of P and Q by (V P , E P ) and (V Q , E Q ), respectively, and fix a channel chan i→k . If P has no communication actions over the channel, then the first condition of Lemma 9 holds. Now suppose that P does communicate over the channel. Notice that by transitivity of E + relations and of l − →, we need only show the conditions for the last rcv k←i event in P. If there is no node rcv k←i ∈ V s P then, by construction of Sig(P), (e r , lst i ) ∈ E + P where e r is the last rcv k←i in P. Lemma 
events e = rcv k←i ∈ V P we have that e l − → lst i for all such rcv k←i events e in E P . The second condition of Lemma 9 immediately follows. Finally, if there is a e r = rcv k←i in V s P then a similar argument applies: by the theorem's assumption, there exists m ∈ P such that (i)
IfÊ is the edge set of the program graph for P * Q, then we have that (e r , e s ) ∈Ê + . Using Lemma 5 we obtain, for all executions of P * Q, that e r l − → e for i's final action e in Q, and if Q performs an event e s = snd i→k then e r l − → e s as well. By Lemma 9 it follows that Q closes chan i→k after P, as desired. "⇒:" Suppose that Q seals P, that e r ∈ V s P is a rcv k←i , and define e to be the first snd i→k in Q, if snd i→k ∈ V s Q and let e = lst i otherwise. Finally, assume that there is no m such that (e r , fst m ) ∈ E s P and (fst m , e) ∈ E s Q . We claim that e r l − → e does not hold in RelFi executions of P * Q. This will complete the argument, by Lemmas 8 and 9. Assume by way of contradiction that e r l − → e in all Rel executions of P * Q. Then Lemma 5 implies that (e r , e) ∈Ê + , where as beforeÊ is the edge set of the program graph for P * Q. Recall that, by the definition of the signatures Sig(P) and Sig(Q), e r and e also belong to the program graphs of P and of Q, and thus they are nodes of V P and V Q , respectively. Since e r ∈ V P and e ∈ V Q , any path ofÊ edges connecting e r to e must contain an edge whose source is in V P and target is in V Q . This edge cannot connect a send to a receive, because such edges are internal to P or to Q for BSLs. The edge must connect two actions of the same process m, and it follows that (e r , lst m ) ∈ (E P ) + and that (fst m , e) ∈ (E Q ) + . By the definition of signatures and the choice of the nodes involved, this implies that (e r , lst m ) ∈ E s P and that (fst m , e) ∈ E s Q , contradicting the assumption for this part of the proof.
The complexity of computing Sig(P) is in O( P 3 ) because it requires the causality relation obtained as the transitive closure of the edge relation of P's program graph. We remark that for BSLs P and Q, Sig(P * Q) can be obtained from their respective signatures at a cost of O(n 3 ). Given Theorem 4, the complexity of deciding whether Q seals P, given their signatures, is obviously determined by the size of P's signature, and is thus O(n 3 ). Thus, if signatures are precomputed, then the complexity of deciding sealing becomes independent of the lengths of the programs. (See algorithm Is-Seal(P, Q) in Appendix B).
Let P be a BSL and let G = (V, E) be Sig(P). We now illustrate how signatures can be used to decide whether one BSL seals another. Suppose that the BSL P leaves chan i→k open and Q seals P (see both parts of Fig. 7) . Then, if Q sends on that channel, then P's last receive rcv k←i on the channel must causally precede Q's first send snd i→k on it. If Q does not send on the channel, then Q must ensure that any later send on chan i→k is causally preceded by P's last receive. This is guaranteed exactly if P's signature contains an edge (rcv k←i , lst m ) and Q's signature contains an edge (fst m , lst i ), for some m ∈ P.
A characterization of sealability
The state of a program's channels is the essential element in determining sealability. It is straightforward to check Lemma 10 shows that the set of channels closed by a BSL P is uniquely determined by P and can be easily obtained from Sig(P). We can thus associate a closed-channel graph with each BSL . Formally, the closed-channel graph C P = (P, cc P ) of a BSL P is given by (i, k) ∈ cc P iff i = k and chan i→k is closed by P in Rel. In the following we denote the undirected version of a graph G by G u .
Theorem 5 (Sealability) Let P be a BSL . Then P can be sealed properly in Rel iff C u P is connected. Moreover, if P is properly sealable in Rel then it can be sealed by a BSL that transmits at most 3n − 4 messages. Proof "⇒:" Suppose that C u P is not connected. Then P can be partitioned into two non-void sets, A and A, such that there is no channel closed by P between (elements of) the two sets. Assume, by way of contradiction, that the program S properly seals P. Since S is a seal, Lemmas 9, 5 and 10 imply that every message sent in S along a channel not closed by P must be causally preceded by all receives on that channel in P. This holds in particular for all channels between A and A. Notice that there must be receives in P on each of the channels not closed by P. To establish the causal precedences, S must transmit messages. Unless S transmits messages between A and A, it cannot seal P. Consider one of the causally minimal sends of such a transmission in S. As demonstrated in the proof of the "⇒" direction of the proof of Lemma 9, it can interfere with the last receive on that channel in P. Consequently, S does not seal P. "⇐:" The algorithm sketched as Seal(P) takes a BSL P as input and outputs a proper seal for P if P is properly sealable. It refers to the algorithm Closed-Channels presented in Appendix B. Otherwise it is closed transitively by the subsequence of the converge-cast from k to the root v followed by the subsequence of the broadcast from v to i. Phase (a) sends a message on every edge of the spanning tree pointing away from v. Since v was chosen such that at least one edge need not be redirected this requires at most n − 2 messages. Each of the converge-cast phase (b) and the broadcast phase (c) transmits n − 1 messages, one on every edge of T . Altogether, the seal S uses at most 3n − 4 messages.
Observe that Seal(P) constructs a tailor-made tree barrier S between P and any later program. We remark that the proof of Theorem 5 does not require the potential proper seal S be a BSL . The theorem thus shows that if C u P is disconnected, then no program Q ∈ Prg can properly seal P in Rel.
Example 1 Consider a phase P n = * i∈P L i . In P n each process i = 1 sends a message to every other process m = i before receiving the n − 2 messages sent to it in this phase. We can define process i's program L i more formally by
Process 1 in turn receives those messages sent in the L i , that is:
Executing P n beginning with empty channels leaves (n − 1) 2 channels open. The n −1 channels from process 1 are closed. 1 2 3 . . . n Fig. 8 The closed channel graph of P n Nevertheless, P n can be sealed efficiently by the program Seal(P n ) from the proof of Theorem 5 above. Since the channels from 1 to any of the other processes are closed by P n , any process other than 1 can be chosen as the root v on line 4. (See Fig. 8 for the closed channel graph of P n .)
In fact, we can use this example to show that the upper bound stated in Theorem 5 is tight.
Theorem 6 (lower bound) For all n > 2, there exists a sealable BSL P n such that every proper seal S of P n sends at least 3n − 4 messages. Proof Let n > 2 and let P n be the program defined in Example 1, and assume that S is a proper seal of P n . We shall show that S must send at least 3n − 4 messages. (µ) .) With respect to the ordering defined by σ , we say that a message µ sent to process m is a clincher if, for all processes m = 1 there exists a message µ sent to m up until (and including) µ such that m ∈ caused(µ ). Thus, once every message sent up to and including µ according to the order defined by σ is delivered to µ's destination process m, the latter will have causal chains from all necessary processes. Since S must create a causal chain from 2, . . . , n to every process in P we can conclude that every process must receive a clincher.
We now show that S must send some messages that cannot be clinchers. Consider a process m = 1. We first claim that m cannot send any messages before it has received a message from process 1. Since all outgoing channels from m are open at the end of P n , we have that such a process m cannot send a message on a channel m → i before this channel is closed by a causal chain i Y m. If i = 1, then such a causal chain must, in turn, end with a message arriving on an incoming channel k → m. If k = 1 then we have that m is sending to i only after receiving from process 1 as claimed. Otherwise, the message sent on k → m requires that k → m has been closed in S. That would require a causal chain from m to k, which must start with a message sent by m. It follows that m can send no message and can receive no messages from processes other than 1 before it receives at least one message from process 1.
In order to create causal chains from every m = 1 to all other processes, S must have every such process send one or more messages. By the above, then, every process m = 1 must receive a message from process 1.
Suppose that the first message from 1 to j is j's clincher. This implies that there must already be causal chains from all other processes i = j to process 1 when this message is sent. As we showed above, this requires such a process i to send messages. It can only do so after having received its first message from 1. Since at that point in time j has not sent any messages, the first message from 1 to i cannot be a clincher. It follows that process 1's first message can be a clincher for at most one process.
Let i 2 , . . . , i n be a permutation of the processes 2, . . . , n ordered according to when they send their first message according to σ . Thus, i is the −1 st sender among {2, . . . , n}. We denote byμ the first message sent by i . By definition, whenμ is sent, none of the processes in later( ) = {i +1 , . . . , i n } has sent any messages in S that causally precede the sending ofμ . Therefore, there are no causal chains to i from processes in later( ) whenμ is sent. It follows thatμ 2 , . . . ,μ n−1 cannot be clinchers.
We now count the messages S is required to send. Firstly, process 1 must send n − 1 messages of which at most 1 can be a clincher. Secondly, every process i = 1 has to send a messageμ . Of these n − 1 messages, at mostμ n can be a clincher. Finally, each of the n processes must receive a clincher. Moreover, as argued above at least n − 2 of the clinchers sent in S are distinct from the 2(n − 1) messages previously described. We conclude that S must send at least 2(n − 1) + n − 2 = 3n − 4 messages, as claimed.
Conclusion and future work
A subtle yet crucial issue in developing distributed applications is the safe composition of smaller programs into larger ones. The notion of a CCL captures when a program operates as if it were executed in isolation when invoked in the context of a given larger program. We have introduced a framework for studying safe program composition. Using a silent cut operator and a notion of refinement, it enables concise formal definitions of standard notions such as CCL, barriers, and TCC. Moreover, it facilitates the introduction and study of new building blocks for safe composition. The central notion introduced and explored in this paper is that of one program sealing another. Larger programs can be composed from smaller ones provided each smaller program seals its predecessor. Moreover, in this case each of the subprograms is guaranteed to be a CCL, and so their combined behavior can be deduced from the individual guarantees provided from each of the components. Within our framework, it is natural to consider issues of safe composition in different models of distributed computation. Notably, the approach allows for seamless composition of programs without the need for translation or headers.
In the second part of this paper, we studied sealing and safe composition for BSLs ( the class of balanced, straightline programs) in the Rel model, in which message delivery is reliable but channels can reorder messages. While this is a restricted class of programs, the subtleties introduced by message reordering already make for a nontrivial underlying structure of seals for BSLs. Future work will consider extending this class to allow for branching (if-then-elsefi) and looping. These introduce additional subtleties, but the underlying structure discovered in the current analysis appears to remain valid in the broader setting. In another paper [7] , we use essentially the same framework to investigate safe composition in models with FIFO channels that may be prone to message duplication or loss. As in the case of Rel, barriers and TCC layers are also absent in those models. The framework introduced here is used to define two more notions, namely fitting after and separating, that are more readily applicable in those models. 9 We provided tools for deciding whether a BSL P in Rel is sealable, for deciding if Q seals P, as well as for constructing a seal for P if P is sealable. These are based on the program graph and signature of a BSL . We proved that O(n) messages are necessary and sufficient for sealing a sealable BSL in Rel. In particular, this means that a linear number of acknowledgments can be used to seal a quadratic number of open channels. The notion of sealing in Rel is shown to be intimately related to Lamport causality. Based on this connection, we devise efficient algorithms for deciding and constructing seals for the class of straight-line programs. To see how sealing can be used to design useful programs in Rel from simpler ones, recall that mt i→k * mt k→i seals itself in
Rel. Point 5 of Lemma 1 can be used to show that a program of the form while true do mt i→k * mt k→i od will correctly transmit a sequence of values from i to k in Rel. Indeed, if the return messages from k to i are not merely acknowledgments, this can perform sequence exchange.
Observe that neither termination detection nor barrierstyle techniques can be applied in Rel without careful inspection of the surrounding program context. Any such additional mechanism will form a layer in the resulting program which in turn must be shown to safely compose with the other 9 We say that P fits after Q if Q P Q P. Program S separates P from Q if P * S * Q P S Q.
layers. A popular approach to running distributed applications on non-RelFi systems is to construct an intermediate data-link layer providing RelFi communication to the application. This typically involves sealing every single message transmission from interference by previous layers and by later ones. Popular algorithms for data-link achieve this by adding message headers and/or acknowledging every single message, thereby incurring a significant overhead [1, 21] . As we show for Rel, it is often possible to do better than that. Our analysis of sealing can be used to add the minimal amount of glue between consecutive layers to ensure that they compose safely, without changing the layers at all. While our case study focused on a restricted model, future work should perform similar analyses to a broader spectrum of models. In a companion paper [7] the framework is used to define additional notions that are used to study safe composition in FIFO-models with duplicating and/or lossy channels. There is a broad range of other settings to consider. These include the shared-memory models studied by Zwiers and his colleagues [11] as well as richer programs with branching and looping in message-passing contexts.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof (of Lemma 1) First observe that non-deterministic choice distributes over layering, that is, (P + P ) * Q = P * Q + P * Q and P * (Q + Q ) = P * Q + P * Q .
1. Assume that both P and P are sealed by S in , that is, P * S P S and P * S P S by the definition of sealing.
(P + P ) * S (P * S + P * S) distributivity P * S + P * S distributivity P S + P S assumption (P + P ) S distributivity 2. Assume that both S and S seal P in , that is, P * S P S and P * S P S . P * (S + S ) P * S + P * S distributivity P S + P S assumption P (S + S ) distributivity 3. Assume that S seals P in , that is, P * S P S. By monotony of * with respect to refinement, also S * Q seals P in . 4 . Assume that S seals P and S seals S in , that is, (1) P * S P S and (2) S * S S S . P * S * S P S * S assumption (1) and monotony P * S S assumption (2) and monotony 5 . Assume that P seals itself (in ). By induction we show that P also seals P i , for any number i ∈ N of layered compositions of P. The base case is P 0 = ε, which is sealed by every program. The inductive case is an application of point 4 of this lemma. Recall that non-deterministic choice is modelled as union in our semantics. Next observe that the proof of point 1. works for arbitrary unions, too. Finally, the only difference between P ω and the infinite choice between the P i where i ∈ N is that the latter lacks the infinite repetition, P ∞ as a non-deterministic choice. That P also seals P ∞ can be seen as follows. Assume by way of contradiction that P does not seal P ∞ . So there is a program Q such that P * Q interferes with P ∞ . Then it must interfere with one of the infinitely many repetitions, say, the mth. But that repetition is sealed already by the m + 1st repetition in P ∞ . 6. "⇒:" Assume that P is TCC in , i.e., P P . Let Q be a program. Then P * Q P Q by monotony of layering with respect to the refinement order. "⇐:" Assume that every program Q seals P in . Then this is in particular true for the empty program ε, i.e., P * ε P ε. Since ε is a right unit of layering, it follows that P P .
Proof (of Theorem 2) We reduce the halting problem to sealability. Suppose D is a decider for sealability of programs in Prg. Let Prg i be the class of programs of our language Prg for the single process P = {i} containing neither sends nor receives. Observe that halting problem for Prg i is undecidable already because we have full arithmetic over the integers in our programming language. We construct a decider H for Prg 1 as follows. H = "on input P where P ∈ Prg 1 :
1. Construct P ∈ Prg 2 as a variant of P for process 2 by replacing variables of process 1 by variables of process 2. 2. Run D on X * P * P , where X = snd Thus, if D deciding sealability exists then H decides the halting problem for Prg 1 . It follows that sealability is undecidable.
